TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE DISCRETION IN DENYING MOTIONS TO TRANSFER VENUE TO COUNTY WHERE ACCIDENT OCCURRED BASED ON THE FACTS OF THIS WRONGFUL DEATH PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE

Ford Motor Co. v. James, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D836 (Fla. 4^th DCA April 14, 2010):

Plaintiff sued Ford and Michelin for negligence and strict liability after her daughter was killed in a car accident while on a trip with her dance team that left from Broward County and was heading to Alabama.  The tire blew out near Lake City, and the decedent was ejected from the vehicle and later died from her injuries.

Plaintiff filed suit in Broward County.  Ford and Michelin each filed a motion to transfer venue to Columbia County pursuant to §47.122 (forum non-conveniens).  Defendant contended that the accident occurred in Columbia County and the most significant witnesses in the case resided there including law enforcement officers, emergency medical personnel, eyewitness and the medical staff from the hospital as well as the medical examiner.

The plaintiff opposed the motions, pointing out that eight of the other passengers in the vehicle were eyewitnesses to the accident and resided in Broward, as did the driver who was a named defendant.  The decedent was a resident of Broward at the time of her death, and her mother resided there, and the subject vehicle was rented there. 

The court noted the three statutory factors used to determine whether to grant a motion pursuant to §47.122:  (1) convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of the witnesses (most important); and (3) the interest of justice.

Plaintiff identified nine eyewitnesses who were in the vehicle at the time of the accident and were the only individuals to witness it.  This van was also rented in Broward and kept and maintained in Dade.  

Also, as the court noted, the material allegations of the complaint involved a potential manufacturing defect in the tire and the design defect in the van and negligent maintenance.  Thus, the determination on liability was going to turn primarily on expert testimony.  Because there was no suggestion that the experts would be inconvenienced by a trial in Broward, the court held the trial judge properly denied defendant’s motion to transfer venue based on forum non-conveniens. 

TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING DIRECTED VERDICT FOR TRUCKING COMPANY ON NEGLIGENT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE – DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE VICARIOUS LIABILITY INSTRUCTION BECAUSE OF STIPULATION AND DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE ADDITIONAL CONCURRENT CAUSE INSTRUCTION

Beltran v. Rodriguez, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D844 (Fla. 3^rd DCA April 14, 2010):

The decedent made a u-turn, and her car collided with another car.  The parties stipulated she did not stop before making the turn.  She was hit in a sideswipe collision, causing her vehicle to slide 46 feet before coming to rest on the opposite side of the road, at which point (7 seconds later), she was hit by another car.  The decedent died as a result of the two crashes. 

At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the trucking company (involved in the second collision) moved for a directed verdict.  The case proceeded against the truck driver with the stipulation that if the driver was found liable, the company would be held vicariously responsible.  The jury found no liability on the part of the driver. 

Plaintiff had alleged that the trucking company was negligent in inspecting and maintaining the vehicle.  With the scant evidence of negligent maintenance, plaintiff’s expert testified there was also no evidence that the driver took measures to avoid the collision, thereby showing that none of the truck’s defects contributed to the accident. 

There was evidence of the truck’s defective condition, but no evidence that the condition of the truck caused or contributed to the accident.  Thus, there was no jury question presented, and directed verdict was proper. 

It was also not error to refuse to give the jury the vicarious liability instruction.  Because there was a stipulation on that, there was no need.

The trial judge also properly refused plaintiff’s special instruction on concurrent cause, because the standard instruction covered it, and the plaintiff failed to show the instruction she requested was necessary to properly resolve the issues in the case.  There was also no showing that the standard instruction was not sufficient to resolve the issues, and that the jury was in some way misled or prejudiced by the failure to give the additional instruction. 

TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING PLEADINGS AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT, WITHOUT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENTIARY BASIS

Hernandez v. City of Miami, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D847 (Fla. 3^rd DCA April 14, 2010):

Based on discrepancies about his injuries in the plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories and during his deposition testimony, the trial court struck the pleadings, and dismissed the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. 

While a trial court does have inherent authority to dismiss an action as a sanction when a plaintiff has perpetuated a fraud, the power must be exercised cautiously, sparingly and only upon a clear showing of fraud.  For the trial court to properly exercise its discretion, there must be an evidentiary basis to dismiss the case.

Here, the trial court did not have clear and convincing basis to dismiss for fraud.

*Available to handle appellate and trial support matters for attorneys throughout the state.

This entry was posted on Monday, May 3rd, 2010 at 1:03 pm and is filed under The Week in Torts. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.